Russia’s surprising recent Internet shutdown did more than disrupt daily life: it also crippled the regime’s own communications and propaganda. It’s one of a series of strange events—from a diminished Victory Day parade to crackdowns on businesspeople and celebrities—that suggest growing disorder and confusion within the Russian state.

Transcript

Note: this is an AI-generated transcript and may contain errors

Jon Bateman: So we're here today to talk about what's going on inside Russia. The big news event that's driving this conversation, of course, is the so-called internet shutdown that Russians have experienced lately. Can you just bring us up to speed? What is this? Why is it significant? How are people responding?

Alexandra Prokopenko: Internet shutdowns become some sort of a new reality for Russia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, for Russia, after 2022. When drone attacks from Ukraine intensified into Russia, in some regions, regional authorities started to power off mobile internet as a part of defense over drones. But, and it was quite, it was uncomfortable. But explained with security and safety and people get this explanation. In 2026, the picture is different. In March, there was a combination of shutting down a very popular messenger, Telegram, which was used not only by majority of population, it was the second messenger by popularity. First was WhatsApp, which was also shut down. It was used by authorities for their private and sometimes working conversations. It was at the front line by Russian military and it was used by bloggers and this so-called Zad community, so volunteers who are assisting military at the frontline. So it was quite essential for a population, for even patriotic population. The authorities decided to turn off Telegram and then persuade everyone to go to state-designed, state-created messenger called Max. And then, suddenly, without no explanation given, the internet, the mobile internet was turned off in Moscow city for 19 days. And what does it mean for a city which is so digitalized as Moscow? So you cannot use navigation, you cannot pay with your card because payment terminals are not working, some ATMs machines are not working. You cannot use public toilets because Internet of Things works this way or your car cannot leave the garage because Internet of Things requires mobile Internet. And you cannot call to the door of the garage and you can not open this. And this was, and it's very important that no explanation was given. So business has losses and all types of immediate losses and profits which was lost because they were forced to accept only cash. Moscow is quite cashless city.

Jon Bateman: Why now? Vladimir Putin has been in power in some form for over 25 years. The country has been on a war footing now for over four years. These restrictions are more intense than previous internet restrictions. Why now.

Alexandra Prokopenko: I think because they can, because the foundation of relationship between the state, between civil state bureaucracy and so-called siloviks in Russia, so-call enforcement agencies like federal security services and others, become different after the war. And silovics gained additional responsibility. Because of because they because now they have the monopoly on defining what is state interest and what is a state security so the logic of FSB is that there is a lot of wrong in internet there is a lot information which is damaging the foundations of the regime There is a lot of threats of mobile internet, which allows Ukraine to use drones over Russia. There is also a lot forbidden information spreading via telegram. And Russia is at war against NATO, against the Western narrative, against Western allies. And turn off internet, that's the way how they think they can achieve their goals. They are not protecting population, but as any kind of bureaucracy and FSBs and enforcement bureaucracy, they are achieving their KPI. So no one knows about threats, about external threats. So, we are doing our job well. I can bring you one example. Just recently there was a parade in Moscow, a very sacred event for Putin. It's a Moscow celebrated victory day. And the way how- And it's just to commemorate World War II. To commemorate WWII, yes. But the way a Russian authorities prepared to the parade was a real shit show. So, they just, they turned off internet. Both mobile and landline internet. They issued a statement for foreign diplomats that Russia is going to attack Kiev. If Kiev will attack the parade, so remove your stuff from Ukrainian capital. They shortened the parade canceled military vehicles, colognes because of security issues. And it was very very well seen from here, from abroad, I mean. And you can see the coverage in Western media, how pathetic from our side of the border the parade and the behavior of the Kremlin was. But inside Russia, Russian media, Russian state media, which are mostly controlled from the Kremlin, they pointed absolutely different picture. Picture of glorious commemoration that there was a parade, there was different commemorative events that nation united, and not even a word about how ridiculous the preparations was seen.

Jon Bateman: Tell us about the way the populace is reacting to this increased securitization of Russian society from the parade to the internet shutdown. On one level, it seems like there's pockets of, if not resistance, frustration, outrage, and popular dissension. Tell us what you're seeing and hearing on the streets of Russia, and if there are signs that the state has gone too far here.

Alexandra Prokopenko: Well, people are annoyed, both population and elites. For 26 years, Vladimir Putin constructed the image of a vertically controlled system. I mean, decisions were made at the top and handled down for implementation. The system worked because it has a center. And shutdowns destroyed this narrative more effectively than any opposition criticism. So there is no one to blame for shutdowns. It's some random guys from FSB, but no name, sure name, or the position. So who made the final order? And there is an ongoing conflict between civil part of bureaucracy or the civil part of presidential staff who are responsible for propaganda, which doesn't work well without internet connection, by the way. Or domestic politics. This year Russia will have state-duma elections in autumn. And the whole infrastructure of mobilizing regions, of mobilizing corporates, how people need to vote, it's all linked to telegram and all linked internet. So without reliable internet connection, it doesn't work well. So... You can frame this as a conflict between two parts of the bureaucracy, where one part quite discontent and signaling to Putin, please come back and do something with other parts of the bureaucracy who are worsening our job. Also an interesting what we see in presidential approval ratings. Putin's ratings are going down. And that's a reflection, first, that's a reflection of how population feels about these restrictions. Because absence of internet in 21st century in a very digitalized city, it's

Jon Batema: There's a tendency, at least in the West, to view Putin as a kind of master autocrat, someone who is so sophisticated in his use of these authoritarian tools that if he's doing something, it's because that's the smart thing to do for his interests and preservation of the regime. I wonder if you see it that way, because it seems like there's signs with this latest internet shutdown where Maybe it's unclear who's in charge. There's actions being taken that are compromising the regime's popularity in return for the sense of control and security. But is it possible that he's making a mistake here?

Alexandra Prokopenko: I don't think that it's done deliberately by Putin. And I think that illusion that he's still the only person in charge and he has everything under his control could be misinterpreted. It's now a misinterpretation. It was valid. It was so at his first, second, and maybe third presidential term. Then were some turbulence and after the war it to me it seems like Putin loses his grip on the country because he's preoccupied with other with other stuff like military or geopolitics and any kind of you know analysis of Moscow's campaign against the internet has often fallen back on narratives about the arbitrariness of the security services. And this is also a misinterpretation. We're not talking about the security services having arbitrarily deviated from any normal Kremlin. It is a normal Kremlin now, but the head of the Kremlin is preoccupied with other stuff. So this allows the situation to develop this way. So what I'm trying to say, these security forces are not incrementally taking over the system. They are the system. In its current configuration. So it was changed before and now it's become visible.

Jon Bateman:So if Putin is no longer exerting top-down control over every facet of the domestic machinery, what are the constituencies within the regime that are vying for power? And what are major fault lines between them, or the kind of internal debate or struggle below the level of Putin about how to run. Russian society.

Alexandra Prokopenko: Well, what we see now, it's calls for Putin to come back from his cloud, where he is, and do his job.

Jon Bateman: And who's calling for that?

Alexandra Prokopenko: Everyone. So we see this unhappiness publicly, which is not very usual for Russian type of the regime. On Moscow streets, let's say this, if before people were avoiding to express their unhappiness. On the current events. So there were, you know, like a legal way how to complain on prices, on economic situation. It was something, you know, that this talks were okayish. But now people and also members of Russian elites are expressing their negative attitude towards what's going on. And not only on Internet, but also that there is no clear image of future. There is no clear image of victory. No one expects that the war will drag four years in a row and start go to and go beyond. No, one knows when it ends. It consumes resources and people are unhappy with that. Same from a patriotic part of the elites and patriotic parts of the society that they want Putin come back and to and to have the vanguard against all those who are discontent with the current state of affairs, who they required Putin to double down against enemies of the country. They want Putin to be more, maybe bloodthirsty in terms of the war. So just finish the war, but everyone wants him to finish the work, come back to the country and preoccupied with the domestic state of affair. So, and it's all could be framed as a, you know, as a demand for any kind of rules-based order since previously the person who issued the rules, who issued order was Putin himself and now he's absent. And so there is no rules anymore. There is a lot, there's a huge path dependence. And we are at the stage where all kind of horses trying to bring Putin back and restore the center of this hypercentric system.

Jon Batema: This is a fully authoritarian, maybe even closer to a totalitarian regime now. Does it matter that this dissension is bubbling up from the streets and even inside of the system itself? Are these forces capable of pushing Putin to bring the war to a close, restore internet connectivity, become more involved in the governance of the country? Or is he? Fully insulated from these political forces and capable of just continuing on as he wishes.

Alexandra Prokopenko: I think first and further most, it shows that markers that once implied stability, like lack of protests, functional economy or loyal elite, are no longer reliable in terms of Russia. The system could look stable on the surface, while simultaneously crumbling from within. And that's what's happening right now. It doesn't mean that Russian political regime is on the brink of collapse, no. But we see that it's not a monolith, it's a not a homogenic system, that there are a lot of different controversial inside processes which are now conflicting with each other.

Jon Bateman: Yeah. So if the system is crumbling but not in a way that threatens the integrity of the regime itself, what does that mean? Does that just mean the country is just not going to be functioning as well going forward, that there's going to more business disruptions, more sort of counterproductive activity within the state and the security forces? Are we just entering a of greater chaos and confusion.

Alexandra Prokopenko: I cannot give you any time frame to see to what extent this regime is resilient and when it breaks down. Or do we see just cracks or it's fatal distortions. It's not clear. We are at the very beginning of the process. But what do we know now that the internet shutdowns is just It's it's it is just one of many examples There are other examples of a crumbling state capacity when state become less and less functional. For example, protection against external violence. It's the foundation which the social contract between the ruler and the people has historically have built. People and companies pay taxes so the state can ensure their safety, the state ensure their lives and property. But in today's Russia, the situation is different. For example, the 9th May parade, which was sacred by Putin, we discussed that, wasn't protected 100%. And that was the reason why. And you're talking about the 9 May parade.

Jon Bateman: And you're talking about the threat of Ukrainian drone attacks and also Ukrainian ground incursions into Russian territory.

Alexandra Prokopenko: And who pays for it? And who? And that's business. Large business expenses with no compensation from the state. So the situation is that Kremlin started wars and business pay for air defense out of their own pockets. And having received the signal from the government that your security, your problem, it's also a part that state becoming less functional.

Jon Bateman: Sasha, are you saying that Russian businesses actually pay for their own air defenses or just through tax? Yes. What is the-

Alexandra Prokopenko: They are paying anti-drone defenses for like oil companies. They need to pay their own money for these metal nets they're using to cover the facilities from the drones.

Jon Bateman: Wow, a very tangible manifestation of what you're describing, the state no longer being able to offer the security portion of the social contract. Are people feeling as though the state is losing its legitimacy on a basic level? And when I say people, maybe we could break that down into the different groups that have some sort of power. I know you've written a lot about the kind of technocrat class, the what we might formally have called an elite within Russian society, the civil servants. People who manage the central bank, other parts of the apparatus. What are those people thinking and feeling right now?

Alexandra Prokopenko: They are confused, because even previously they showed that they were forced to exist in a very unpredictable environment. And now this environment became even less predictable, and there is no center where they can complain, or even not complaining, but explain the situation and fix the problems. Previously, there were some mechanisms how they can settle. Their existence. Now it seems that these mechanisms are broken or functioning differently. That's in terms of internet. Russia is now entering the budgeting process. So Russia's economy is in quite a bad equilibrium. It's coming after, and it's looking for a new one, but it probably would be worse. Just recently there was an interview of Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak. Who called the new budget structure as a problem for the government. I mean, by saying new budget structures, he means elevated expenditures on everything, including the war. That's a very Russian infamistic way to say that, yeah, that your war is our problem because Putin has started the war, but finance the war is the problem of the government and this problem is getting more and more intense. Since the reserves are exhausted.

Jon Bateman: So I know that energy prices are very important for the Russian economy and the Russian state budget. Energy prices are very elevated right now due to the war in Iran. Which of these factors matters more, the elevation of energy prices and the increasing revenue that Russia gets from that, or the tremendous expenditures of a wartime economy? How are those two things balancing?

Alexandra Prokopenko: Yes, and a very interesting thing happened with this additional revenues for the budget. First and foremost, they are less than expected. Second, for Russian economy, they're provided only, you know, like an additional oxygen for a mountain area. It's nothing, it's not a game changer. And third... I think it was, it was backed by the Kremlin, but the decision was to double down the expenditures. And we see the state budget on a record high, which means that state continue doubling down expenditures regardless of the factor that additional revenues from conflict in Persian Gulf are temporary. So, it's all like mortgaging the future. Someone needs to pay for this bill, someone needs to cover this deficit, and this deficit would be covered by domestic borrowings, by maybe some budget expenditures, recalibration, but it's all unhealthy situation. That's what we see now.

Jon Bateman: And then I guess when all is said and done in the war, there will have to be a major effort to take care of wounded veterans, widows, orphans. The latest estimates coming out of U.S. Think tanks and independent Russian media in exile is that Russian kill count, the Russian soldiers who have died during the or are above 350,000, which... It's almost like approaching like maybe 1% of the military-age males in the country. It's an astonishing figure. And what kind of burdens does that create going forward?

Alexandra Prokopenko: Well, officially, Russia never recognized the losses and that's a part of state-run policy. I also think that one of the reasons why FSB now is closing the internet so heavily is that probably they feel the anxiety of the population and they want to prevent any horizontal contacts between different groups of population, especially patriotic groups who are more tied to the war, who are involved in discussion on losses, on benefits, and on how to continue living after the war than people of big cities and so on and so forth. But war is not an elephant in the room anymore. Different groups of population discussing different outcomes. There is no problem with veterans yet and I think that experts in in the United States or here in the West talking about veterans much more than Russian authorities. But this problem is not existing because the war continues and these people are still at the front line. I think Russian authorities are well aware that The problem appears after the ceasefire. But there is no any kind of systemic solutions preparing to facing this problem first. And second, they all required money, which are not there. So there is financing for this kind of program.

Jon Bateman: We've been talking at a pretty high level about the strategic challenges facing the Russian state and how different groups within the state and power structure are contesting for solutions or authority within that system. Could we make this a bit more personal and kind of talk about the type of people that fill these roles and what their psychology is at a moment like this? You have an insider perspective. You formerly were an advisor at the Russian Central Bank. You also were a journalist in Russia and cultivated high-level sources throughout the Russian power structure. Who are these people today, the people running the machinery? What is their personality, their mood? What does it look and feel like to be inside this world right now?

Alexandra Prokopenko: I never considered myself as a part of Russian elite, but to me, the war was a transformative event which made my personal life inside country, in country aggressor as impossible and which brought me to a huge identity crisis since on my birth certificate states that I'm Ukrainian. And I come from a Soviet family. And when I was born, Ukraine was part of Soviet Union, but still they recognized nationalities. And back then in 2022 to me was quite hard to figure out who am I, Russian, Ukrainian? Does it matters? Why it matters, what it is for me? So it was quite a complicated dialog. Speaking on my former colleagues who are still there, some of them were not, I think, looking at this technocratic system, it's an assemblage of personal decisions. So it was a privilege to step down and go and leave. Immigration is not an easy way, but it's more safer than staying in Russia. People are terrified fear is one of the biggest drivers of why they are in places and it's sometimes it's fear is overstated fear over fear against FSB that you can be imprisoned that you get killed. People are afraid of their physical security and they know that this regime could kill their opponents or not even an open open ends but those people which the regime doesn't like. And no one wants to be there. And there are different stories, like I traveled to Russia back in 2022. And for example, I met with one deputy minister in the cafe, and he literally sits on his phone, on his iPhone, because that was the recommendation from their security officer. That that's the way how they can prevent overhearding or recording the conversations via his phone. And he was like, you know, he was very embarrassed when someone ringed him and he need to put his phone out of his ass basically, and answering that I'm in the meeting, sorry, and put it back. And there was a lot of other anecdotal evidence of this tremendous fear which these people have.

Jon Bateman: Just on this fear factor, obviously, for someone like that, he is trying to avoid running afoul of the being on the wrong side of the rules, the explicit rules, the implicit rules. How clear is it to someone like that what the rules are and if they're changing? You hear stories from time to time about maybe higher levels of Russian officials and oligarchs that are following afoul of the or maybe a broadening of what the implicit rules are. Do people have a sense of what it is that they need to do and say and not say, or is that shifting?

Alexandra Prokopenko: It's shifting in normal conditions. They thought that they know the rules explicit and implicit and their super power is to recognize changes in implicit rules and now it's changing. And now I think it wouldn't be an overstatement to picture all these people standing at the red square and shouting, bring us rules. What our rules are. And something like that, because we discuss the economy, we discuss internet shutdowns, there is a very interesting process of redistribution of assets from one owner to another in Russia, which I think very important for the future of Russia. And people are terrified to lose their assets because of whatever.

Jon Bateman: And are you talking about oligarchs, ordinary people whose assets are being redistributed?

Alexandra Prokopenko: Oligarchs and businessmen. For ordinary people, the situation is different. For oligarchs, for medium-sized businesses, former western owners of different companies. So you can lose your assets in Russia because you have a western passport, which wasn't forbidden. Thank you very much. Were not Western, but like the story with Domodedovo Airport, where one of the reasons why state nationalized the airport was that its beneficiaries has a temporary residency permit in Israel and in United Arab Emirates, which are not even considered as non-friendly countries by Russian legislation. Or just a very recent case when the state nationalized Rusagro holding, one of the largest agricultural holdings, and it belonged to Vadim Moshkovich, who was on top Forbes, who was former senator, and they said, okay, he was corrupted. It was corruption. And this corruption took place 15 years ago or more. And now we're taking his assets for a billion dollars, worth billion dollars. So there is no rules at all. No, no, no.

Jon Bateman: So even for the top, the wealthiest and most politically connected elite, there is a growing instability around how you stay on the good side of the regime.

Alexandra Prokopenko: Absolutely, absolutely. And here we're talking about business assets. There are terms of people's behavior. I'm writing about this in my book. In winter 2023, just a few days before the New Year's Eve, which is quite important holiday for Russian population, much more important than Christmas, there was a party called almost naked party, where was a dress code coming almost naked. And then participants of this party was canceled. And not only canceled by, I mean, random users of social network, not by society. Society wasn't actually ever, I meant, involved or aware of this part. But for example, episodes with some participants of this, of this priority were cut off. Already filmed New Year movies. So, you know, it's three days to the New Year and you need to re-film part of the movie because you cut some major heroes. Their contracts on New Year parties was canceled. They were forced to go to the front line to sing soldiers songs and to be forgiven for this, and there was also an indication that they broke some rules, but they... But they explicitly said that we don't know that these rules are existing and it's also a very interesting definition that the state Wanted people to act like this is a holy war Never admitting that this is war. It's a special military operation. So it's something which conducted by professionals somewhere It's not it's not involved the whole nation. It does not bring another types of atos and other types of behavior It not makes the whole population, the whole society to dress, to wear hockey and, you know, to share this war attitude. But the level how, to the extent how this people were canceled was tremendous. And that was the first sign of this, you know, show us the rule book. We will be obedient. But please tell us the rules. And so the unique feature of this situation now, that on every level, cultural, business, technological, there is a huge demand on rules, and we see that Kremlin just gave up its role on producing these rules.

Jon Bateman: Where is all of this headed? Because I think an overall theme from this conversation is a political and cultural system, a regime facing growing internal pressures, contradictions, confusion, chaos, with the overarching trend being toward more securitization and control, but sometimes in a confusing fashion. There's a couple big events that are coming up that we know are coming that could force some kind of reckoning. One is some resolution of the Ukraine War, where maybe the immediate security threats that are used to justify many of these moves are taken off the table. And two is the departure of Vladimir Putin from the scene. He's in his early 70s, So he could continue ruling for some time. But on some level, there is a reckoning coming... Something will have to change, perhaps? Or do you agree with that? What will happen in the future? Where is all of this headed?

Alexandra Prokopenko: So for the near-time future, I think we need to be clear that regime has a lot of different kind of repressive tools at their disposal to preserve and to maintain status quo. And Putin, he's in a quite good house and he has access to very good health care. So he can stay with us for next five, ten years. I don't like this scenario, but it's likely, so he's not going anywhere. But what we see, and it's not because of Putin, it's also visible with the current state of Putin which I don't think that will improve somehow. It's the request on an image of future. Putin monopolized the ability to produce image of future to define to we on which direction state goes and we're in how the future for elites, population, syllabics, how the future for the whole country will look like. And now it is a vacuum. And I don't think that this vacuum is longer existing. And this is a chance. Probably wouldn't be immediately picked up by some political powers since there is no visible political powers in Russia But there should be a common a competition of other future projects And since Putin is losing grip on domestic stuff because he's preoccupied with the war with geopolitics Where the revisionists a role of Russia in the globe? Some alternative Future visions of future would appear And it appeared previously like the Evgeny Prigozhin Putin's cock march on Moscow could be considered and could be framed as this kind of alternative vision of the future.

Jon Bateman: Yeah, so this was the event where one of the most powerful figures in Russia, the head of the Wagner private military corporation, staged a mutiny and took over a major military base, marched on Moscow. Eventually, this was put down. He surrendered, and he died in a plane crash. And this was a moment a couple, two, three years ago where it seemed like the Russian regime was maybe at its most fragile. But you take that moment as... Some kind of signal for an alternative future? Is that the notion that the patriotic front within Russia, the kind of pro-war dissenters could somehow take over and create an even more jingoistic militarized society?

Alexandra Prokopenko: Not necessarily pro-war. I mean, you know, what stuck me the most during Prigozhin's mutiny was the reaction of some of my interlocutors on this. So, they were all terrified and scared because something like this never seen before in Russian modern history, but they were also very enthusiastic, like something changed, something happens. It seems that so I can frame it the way that Russian elites has no agency for changes. So that's why they have a great hope on something external that someone from someone outside of their bubble, which pre-Goshen was perfectly are, come and change the situation somehow. So, and then they will step in, they will act, and so on and so forth, but the first changes need to be brought from the outside. And I think with such heavy demand on image of future, if these images of future will appear, we could see a very interesting configurations and very interesting return of politics into Russia. Because one of the biggest Putin's project was how to depoliticize Russia to keep himself as the only center of politics.

Jon Bateman: That's a fascinating portrait of a Russian elite that has given up on influencing the course of the nation and is simply waiting for someone else to present them an opportunity to do so. When that finally happens, do you have a sense of the two or three potential visions that someone might offer? Or even what would Putin say the day the war in Ukraine ends, and he then has to give a speech to the nation describing the nation's purpose and where everything is headed outside or separate from this war. What will he say? What might he say?"

Alexandra Prokopenko: Of course, for sure, he will say that Russia won the war and everyone was war heroes and so on and so forth. Because he's not in the position to lose this war, at least in the eyes of Russian propaganda, so that's obviously what he said, what he will see. The problem here is that Russian society doesn't feel participants of this war as war heroes. They do not treat them, they're mercenaries who went to the front line for money and people and then Russian society absolutely lost the sense of why the war started, who started this and they just want it to be over. So I think, so Putin will, will Russian society buy this for, buy this Putin's speech, Putin's explanation? I'm not sure. But then we're coming back to my words about state has a lot of repression tools. So for some time, the situation would be manageable. But then, I mean, there is no road without bumps for Russia in the future. If the war is over, then the economy will stay heavily militarized for a while because uh because of its structure. The economy will remain under sanctions, which is quite an effective cap on Russian technological development. So, countries like United States, Russia's biggest partner China, Europe, moving towards AI, quantum computing and other technologies and Russia would lagging behind because it's inability to produce hardware. And inability to produce software because of internet restrictions, because of security. So Russia will be a yesterday's economy with quite a grim perspective. And the population know that there would be less security because it's unclear what kind of ceasefire we will see. Will drones' attacks continue after this ceasefire? To what extent? To what objects? And so on and so forth. And we see how state is not responsible for security anymore, or trying to be less responsible for security. So I don't see, I cannot, I don't know what kind of alternative future projects we will see, but we can figure out what kind trade-offs. Any Putin successor will need to figure out, we need to deal with, like keeping the country as a North Turkey or having some deals with the West, somehow opening a country's economy to have access to technology, to additional market. And culturally, I mean, Russia never was a part of Russia never was an Asian country. Never was a part of Asian cultural space. It was like European, Western cultural space, then of course, all these imbalances inside economy, how to deal with this extended military expanded, military sector and the civil economy, which is lagging behind. Then what, how to with the workforce crisis, which is quite acute for Russia. All this stuff, I think, all these issues will require different political decisions, which the current Russian elite are not able to take. Those who will take this responsibility, he can win additional, I don't know, not votes, but he can gain additional political capital. But of course we need to be prepared that the Russian path wouldn't be democratic. It could go to more far right leadership or something like this. So I don't know will it be right, left, centric or democratic or not. But I think we need be prepared there would be some future scenarios we won't like.

Jon Bateman: And to Westerners, the assumption is, if there are cracks emerging or a weakening of Putin's regime, that's good because that creates alternatives, alternative possibilities. And there's, I think, an assumption in the West that those alternative possibilities are more democratic, more liberal, more friendly to the United States. But my sense from you, Sasha, is that's not an assumption that anyone could make. And pergosion illustrates that.

Alexandra Prokopenko: I think cracks are good, because cracks definitely leads to changes. But we need to be prepared that we don't like these changes.

Jon Bateman: The picture that I'm getting from our conversation is one of contradictory instability and at the same time still some stasis. On the one hand, Russia is changing. There's an intensification of the security culture. There's a sense that the rules are becoming more ambiguous. There's sense of chaos and conflict. So maybe the contradictions of the Russian ruling system are growing. On the other hand, I also hear you saying that big changes in the way Russia has governed in its economic prospects in hope for the future, we're not seeing a strong prospect for that anytime soon. What do you see? Are we in a moment of change? Are we at a moment stasis? Is it both? I'll give you the final word here.

Alexandra Prokopenko: I think we're definitely living in a very interesting moment. Is it a moment of stasis or changes? Hard to say. We're at the very beginning of the new stage of how this wild Putinism will develop. It's on its late stages. For this type of regimes could be different future scenarios. We definitely see that Putin loses his grip inside country, and outside he's not very successful, frankly speaking. I mean, his bets on Donald Trump or on friendship with Xi Jinping are beneficial, but not beneficial 100% for Putin. It's not a very comfortable space for Putin now. So we're at the very beginning. I think that we need to... Be open-minded and clear-eyed on what we see, believe to our eyes, and let's gather in a while and discuss changes.

Jon Bateman: Love to do that. Let's see where all this is headed. I'd love to have you back on. Sasha, thanks for joining us today.

Alexandra Prokopenko: Thank you, it was very interesting conversation.